EndCryptor 's  properties when the security data is exposed
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EndCryptor has a security database where it stores the public keys received and the private keys created. This database is encrypted and accessible if the user's entry password to the database is known.

We now explain the situation that arises e.g. if a hacker Eve succeeds in accessing the computer of say Alice who is communicating with Bob. The attacker now succeeds in installing spying software (e.g. key logger) and then tries to utilize the security database, which she has transferred to herself. Note that these kinds of attacks have in real life been demonstrated against encryption software packages - a known example being the Caligula virus.

This exposure of the security database can happen other ways also: the user turns from friend to foe and reveals the data to the adversary; or is forced (e.g. by a court order) or lured to reveal current security data; etc.

Decryption of messages

Eve's possibilities to decrypt before (old) or after (new) this exposure transmitted and captured messages are limited:

o    Old and new encrypted messages sent from Alice can't be decrypted by Eve.

o    Old encrypted messages sent from Bob to Alice that have been decrypted by Alice cannot be decrypted by Eve - this is called backward security.

o    New messages sent from  Bob to Alice can be decrypted by Eve until Alice sends a message to Bob and Bob decrypts this message. Encrypted messages now sent from Bob to Alice cannot any more be decrypted by Eve - EndCryptor has recovered. If exposure of the security database is suspected, using this feature it is possible to achieve secure state by sending a dummy  message to the sender of an important message before the important message is encrypted and transferred - the time window for successful attack will thus become very narrow.

Note that if messages are exchanged in turns then the number of messages from Bob that the attacker can decrypt is either zero (Alice sent a message to Bob just after the intrusion) or one (Alice sent a message to Bob just before the intrusion) until the attacker has to perform a new hacking intrusion.

 

Identity hijacking

Because Eve has the security database and its password she may try to send messages to Bob and pretend herself being Alice (Eve uses a special program available in the Internet that fakes the sender of email).

o    If Alice sends a message to Bob before Eve does then Eve's all messages are rejected by Bob's EndCryptor - the hijacking attempt has failed.

o    If Eve is that one who sends the first message to Bob then it is accepted by Bob's EndCryptor but then Alice's all further messages will be rejected by Bob's EndCryptor. Also all Bob's messages to Alice are rejected by Alice's EndCryptor (but accepted by Eve's). If messages are being rejected it should alarm the true holder of the identity.

Protection against id theft is important since a user may have blind reliance on the protection given by a digital signature which assures that the message comes from Alice. As shown above an adversary may steal information and then try identity theft. 

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In most encryption systems an exposure of the victim's security data leads to the situation where all previous encryptions to (maybe also from) the victim can be decrypted.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

In most encryption systems the theft of the exposed security data opens the door for identity theft.